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[program begins with introduction in background, off microphone]
HARRISON SCOTT BROWN: Thank you. I would like to… wow. [responding to high volume of
microphone] I'll tone down now; I’ll whisper. I would like to spend the first part of the
afternoon talking about the the evolution of the present global food situation. As you know,
people have certain minimum needs for food. They need a certain number of calories; a
certain quantity of protein which has the right amino acid distribution and so forth. For the
most part, the people in the world just barely get that amount. Quite a few get less than
that amount, and therefore they lead less than optimum lives. But as people get richer, they
like to eat richer diets. And what that usually means is that they eat more animal products,
eat more steaks, more chicken; they drink more milk, milk products, cheese, and what have
you. And the basic figure that we have to keep in mind is very rough, but animals eat
vegetation, just as people eat vegetation, in the form of rice, wheat, and so forth.
But the animal has to live, keep warm, and so forth. And so the animal gives a net return of
just a few percent of what has gone into the animal. So the caloric content of a piece of beef
is only about 10% of the caloric content of the food that went into the cow in the first place.
The cow has frittered away the rest just keeping warm and walking around and staying
alive. So it's a very wasteful process. It varies a great deal; chickens are more efficient than
cattle. And certain animals eat things that human beings can't eat anyway. But on the whole
it is a wasteful process, and we do feed animals food which in countries which have very
little protein intake, animal protein intake, is consumed directly by the people themselves.

As a result, the per capita cereal consumption in the United States is very, very high. But
only a part of that cereal is consumed directly. The rest of it is fed to animals. And indeed,
we feed more cereal to animals than we eat directly ourselves. So when we talk about food
needs, we have to define what we mean by need. Just like when we talk about material
needs, at one time the automobile was a luxury, and now it's a necessity. At one time a
beefsteak was a luxury, and in the United States, a beefsteak has taken on the appearance
of a necessity; you feel deprived if you can't have it.
So as time has gone on in the world, food needs have increased in part because population
has increased and in part because people have become richer. And they can afford more
expensive food. They can afford to let the cows fritter away as much energy as they do.
That's the first basic element of what has been happening, and of these two effects, they've
been about equal. Population growth has been very important. But the growth of affluence
in North America and Europe and Japan has been equally important in determining the total
level of food consumption in the world. And indeed, although we are the highest food
consumers per capita in the world today total, the Japanese and the Americans and the
Europeans are catching up with us. It comes as quite a cultural shock. I go to Japan fairly
often, but it really still hits me right in the forehead here when I walk out of a building and I
see a Colonel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken right across the street, or a McDonald's
hamburger restaurant. And these are very popular in Japan, and the popularity is growing,
even with steak selling at $10 a pound.
Now, there is a certain amount of flexibility in all of this. I was quite interested—and all of
this depends upon cultural values—I was quite interested, when I was asking a European
economist, how did the Europeans adjust to the very large increase in the price of gasoline,
which was occasioned by the very large increase in the price of crude oil in 1973-74? Are
they driving less? He said Oh, no. They're eating less meat. And this is true; the love affair
between the Italian and his automobile is so passionate, that they're willing to eat less meat
and more spaghetti, I guess, in return for not depriving themselves and driving their cars.
And this of course depends upon one's individual values.
I don't know what the situation would be in the United States if we suddenly increased the
price of gasoline to two dollars a gallon. How would we adjust? Would we eat less meat, or
would we drive less, or would we overthrow the government? I suspect the latter. Now, the
second basic kind of situation that has developed has involved agricultural productivity. We
in the United States encountered these vast areas which could easily be put into agricultural
production. And we applied scientific methods to agriculture. And we mechanized, and we
produced huge quantities of cereals: wheat, corn, and now rice and sorghum, for which
there is an export market. Indeed, it has been the export of agricultural products which has
which enabled the United States to accumulate capital as rapidly as we did, and has
traditionally been our largest single export. The same thing has been true in Canada; the

same thing as been true in Australia; with the result that North America is by far the largest
single exporter of foodstuffs in the world. Right behind that we find Australia and New
Zealand.
Now, we were able to produce food so cheaply that it paid… well, it became no longer
profitable for many parts of the world to to increase their own agricultural production. It
was less expensive for them to concentrate on manufacturing things, and then to use the
money they made from the manufacturing process to purchase food. And that is what has
been happening in Europe. And that is what has been happening in Japan. This is not the
first time in history when that process has been undertaken. In ancient Greece, farmers
discovered they could make more money by concentrating on the products of the vine and
the olive tree, namely making wine and and olive oil and exporting it, than they could make
by growing wheat. And as a result, Greece became completely dependent upon imports of
food, real food that they could eat. For her survival, and she paid for it, of course by
exporting olive oil and grapes. But then the Romans caught on to the same thing in Italy,
and the farmers there discovered they could make more money by concentrating on the
grape and the olive, and the Romans to became dependent upon imports and to feed their
population. They were heavy competitors with the Greeks, and and put the Greeks out of
business pretty much in this respect. But their dependence upon food imports led
subsequently to grave internal difficulties, because the breadbasket of Rome was North
Africa, and tremendous ecological changes took place in North Africa over a period of time.
With the result that wheat got very difficult to come by, and as a result the Romans
suffered.
The British went through the same process after the Industrial Revolution. They were
completely self-sufficient in food production. And then they found it was cheaper to import
food from the colonies and primarily from North America than to grow it themselves, and
they increasingly became dependent upon imports. They crossed the the boundary in the
mid-part of the 19th century, much as we crossed the oil importation boundary around
1948.
So we have this very interesting situation of of a collection of rich nations, three of which
are major exporters and count on those exports for their economic well-being: the United
States, Canada, and Australia, and New Zealand to a lesser extent. And then a bunch of rich
importers which count on the availability of that exported food for their own survival. Here,
we're dealing mainly with Western Europe and with Japan primarily, and then to a lesser
extent with the more advanced and certain more advanced industrial… more advanced
developing countries, Taiwan and Korea.
Now in the meantime, the situation in the rest of the world has been changing, in that
population pressures have increased demands for food in the developing countries at a rate

which has been greater since World War Two. The demand has grown at a more rapid rate
than the rate of expansion of agricultural production in many of these areas. Superimposed
upon that, as I've already mentioned, affluence has been growing, so the demands for
exports has been growing. And in a large country like the Soviet Union, the demands have
grown more rapidly than the agricultural production there in the following sense: that the
people of the Soviet Union have wanted a richer diet for a long time. The government has
given them a steadily richer diet. But they haven't been able to produce all of it themselves;
the agricultural situation in the Soviet Union is difficult one, in part because they have had
to push into the more difficult areas for growing things, of Siberia and so forth, where it is
very sensitive to changes of weather, and in part because of organizational problems,
internal organizational problems. Their farm collectives don't work all that well; they have
difficulty pulling themselves together, so to speak, from the point of view of agricultural
production.
So depending upon the the variability of weather, the Soviet Union too comes on the
market for cereals, and in difficult times will come on the market for a lot of cereals. And
when they have a good year, she's not on the market, and depending upon what the market
is like in the producing countries, or depending upon what the crops are like and so forth,
that will determine whether we go through a period of glut or famine, or scarcity rather.
Indeed, whether the Soviet Union buys or doesn't buy is a major determining factor,
because we simply don't have very large buffer stops. The food situation is handled entirely
on the open market; it's handled through middlemen and women, I guess, here in the
United States, for example, who deal in these things. And it's quite profitable to them, and
the ups and downs are not much of a worry to them. They much prefer, I think, to have
these instabilities in the system than to have a perfectly steady predictable thing, because
that's the way they make their money: speculating.
Now again, I'm just looking at the system of industrialized rich countries of which the Soviet
Union is one. This is a system where you have these fluctuations which are basically caused
by changing weather. It's caused also by sudden infestations. For example, we were hit not
long ago in the United States by a corn blight which which devastated a lot of the crop and
produced a very difficult situation. I will add to that the special relationship that exists in the
United States between the farmer and the government, because for a very very long time
our productive capacity was much greater than the market. And in order to keep things on a
relatively even keel, the government had to enter a program of paying farmers to keep land
out of use. And it long resorted to a system of subsidized prices and so forth and so on.
Clearly, a long time ago, the government recognized that the food situation, the food
problems of the United States and our export market, our own needs and so forth,
stabilization of food prices internally, could not be handled through the free play of the
marketplace, as they began interfering with it, sometimes properly and sometimes

improperly. In any event, as a result of these increasing demands, external demands, we
reached the point where we have a market for virtually everything we can sow. And so our
stock, our reserves, went down to practically zero. And indeed, our reserves in the form of
fallow land also went down to zero; everything that can easily be… that can be called really
truly productive land is now in production. And without the buffer stock, and without that
buffer of land that can be put into production on relatively short notice. We exist in rather a
precarious situation, because any combination of a number of events can result in our
decreased ability to export, which means decreased for an exchange for us. And don't forget
that the agricultural exports make the difference between red and black. Well, our trade
deficit is now so red anyway, but it would be even redder were it not for that that
agricultural export, which is essential at the present time to our economic well-being.
These fluctuations can take very serious forms; for example, in 19—I mentioned this this
morning—in 1974, I guess it was, the government saw, while there was a bad year for
soybeans, the price of soybeans started to go up rather rapidly, the government saw that
this could be a destabilizing element and the in the cost of living, and so we declared a
soybean embargo, an embargo on the export of soybeans. The main country hit by this with
Japan. The Japanese still haven't gotten over that, because soybeans… in addition to the fact
that that they like to eat them, it's sort of a security blanket for them. They still refer to that
soybean embargo, they literally refer to it to this day is the first Nixon shock. And it really
shook up Japanese society. And I think one has to appreciate how important the soybean is
in Japanese culture to understand the impact that this had there… to the point when I was
in Japan in 1976—I'm sorry, 1977, last year—the president of Brazil went to Japan with his
entourage, and they negotiated three billion dollars’ worth of major agreements between
the two countries, including one huge agreement whereby Japanese are going to show
Brazilians how to grow soybeans, and are going to invest in soybean plantations. And with
the Japanese guaranteed full access to the products thereof. It’s a very large agreement,
occasioned by what they perceive to be, and I think correctly, a real need for diversification
of supply, rather than just being dependent upon North America.
So what I'm going to say next, then, must be looked within the framework of this backdrop
of what the rich nations are doing about food. Now, for many many decades we've been
selling food to developing countries who could afford to pay for it. We have sold a lot of
rice, soybeans, feed grains of all sorts. But we really weren't giving cereals away. However,
our surpluses did get very large. Our stocks built up to quite a high level. And finally
Congress passed a remarkable law, which is known as Public Law 480. And this is a law that
has many many features connected with it, but it permits the United States government to
give as outright gifts, or… well, to give as outright gifts, food to countries which need the
food, or to sell it to them on concessional terms, and these concessional terms usually took
the form of their being able to pay for the food in their own currency, and that money in

that currency was put in a bank in the country and could be spent by the United States for
things like our aid missions and so forth and so on in those countries.
It was a remarkable law, because it did make it possible then to get lots and lots of food
shipped to these countries where the food was needed. Now, that doesn't mean that the
food necessarily got to the people who needed it; a lot of it did of course, but in retrospect I
think it's pretty clear that there was a lot of… a fair amount of hanky-panky going on, and a
lot of the food was diverted into regular commercial channels; but the fact remains this law
was unprecedented, I think, in history.
And there were many provisions, again, including sending food through private agencies,
through international agencies and so forth; and this was all fine and good as long as we had
surpluses. It is perhaps significant that once those surpluses disappeared, and the only food
left to sell or to send abroad could be purchased, we stopped giving food to the needy.
Almost no food now flows under the Public Law 480, but the law is still on the books and I
would guess if there's a big surplus again in the future, which I doubt very strongly, that this
would be renewed. But at the present time, the developing countries who need food, who
need to import food, will get it only through competition on the open market, in the open
marketplace.
Now with respect to these countries, that's a very small amount anyway. Only a tiny amount
of food goes from North America or Australia to the developing countries. Most exports, the
the lion's share of the exports, go to the more developed countries and to the rich countries
who can afford to pay for it, and to some poor countries who can afford to pay for it in hard
currency. For example, China has worked with—the People's Republic of China—has worked
for a long time attempting to develop its own agriculture to the point where they reach a
level of self-sufficiency. They're doing a remarkable job, I think. But they have their ups and
downs, occasioned by ups and downs of weather, and the one politically destabilizing thing
that can happen, one of the most important politically destabilizing things that can happen
in China, is a food shortage, a real honest-to-god food shortage. And the Chinese leaders are
quite aware of this and so when they see anything like this lying ahead, they will themselves
go on the market with good hard currency. And so from time to time you see very large
purchases emerging from China. They usually buy them from Canada, but sometimes from
the United States as well.
And this in itself has a destabilizing influence upon the overall market. There are some
countries which we would call poor countries, which import food from us on a regular
continuing basis. They do this just consciously spending their their foreign exchange on this
in part because they have to. There are some countries which just regularly import food
because they simply can't do enough themselves to feed themselves. Sri Lanka is an
example there. But for the most part in developing countries food that is imported is

irrelevant. It's what they grow themselves that is of critical importance, and it is how they
get their food, how the food becomes distributed, that is of critical importance as well.
In 1975, I had the interesting experience of being tapped to be chairman of a major study on
the world food situation, which President Ford had asked the National Academy of Sciences
to undertake. The study, which we called the World Food and Nutrition Study, took two
years. It involved—it was a massive affair—it took 1500 people altogether that were
involved, experts in agriculture and nutrition and the like. And the report was delivered to
President Carter just a year ago, and some of our conclusions in that study I think are quite
important. Perhaps the most important eye-opener for me, as a non-expert in the field, was
that if you're trying to put your finger on the main cause of hunger and malnutrition in the
world today, it is not lack of food, it is poverty. That for the most part those 800 million
people who live near the edge of starvation in the world don't get enough to eat simply
because they don't have access to the food that exists. They either have no land to grow
their own food, or they don't have a job to make money to buy food. And that's the major
single cause, whether it be a poor person living in the rural areas or whether it be a poor
person living in the in the city.
The most important single cause of hunger and malnutrition in the world is poverty, and
that if by some miracle the production of food in the world were to be doubled suddenly,
that would have very little effect in the short run on the hunger and malnutrition situation.
This, to me, was an eye-opener. That if one is really going to do something about the
problem of hunger and malnutrition, you have to get right at the poverty issue.
Now that doesn't mean we shouldn't grow more food. That does not mean that the United
States should not take more seriously the problem of of giving food where it seems
desirable, where there's a famine or where there is some kind of a circumstance like a
pestilence that is disturbing the the overall picture. But it does mean that unless we get at
the problem of poverty in the world, no matter what else we do is of little avail.
Now beyond that, it's terribly interesting to examine the tremendous variations with which
the people of developing countries come to grips with this problem. Some come to grips
with it effectively. Some don't come to grips with it at all. We can get sort of a clue when we
look at certain indicators of well-being in the world, and one tends to use statistics that are
sort of readily available through the United Nations and elsewhere. One useful one is infant
mortality. Nutritionists for the most part pretty much agree that that the greatest single
contributing factor to a high infant mortality is lack of adequate nutrition. That the child
might actually die of some disease, but will die of that disease because he or she is
malnourished. A second statistic that's interesting to look at is just life expectancy at birth,
because this sort of gives an integrated view of not only the level of nutrition in the very
early years, but also some integrated picture of how well the individual is fed, and what the

infrastructure is for for public health over a full lifetime. A third indicator of well-being is
literacy, and it's been pointed out that that one cannot divorce literacy with some of the
other factors of life expectancy and infant mortality.
But the important thing is that one looks at at these qualities, which are are not obviously
connected with such things as per capita income and the like. Because per capita income
can give a grossly distorted picture of what really is going on in most of the developing
world today. As an obvious example there, you can see many African countries where most
people have an annual income of, let's say, most families have an annual income of let’s say
seventy to a hundred dollars a year. And where a handful of plantation owners can have
very, very large per capita incomes in the average, the average looks pretty respectable.
And again, it's a little like the old example of you have one foot in dry ice and the other foot
in boiling water, and you can say that the average is very comfortable.
So the other indicators, other than money, have been put together in sort of a simpleminded index; this was done by the overseas Development Council in New York and
Washington. And it's called the the Physical Quality of Life Index, and it's rather interesting
to look at the relationships there because clearly they are nutrition-related; they are foodrelated to a very major degree. If you turn on the light, please, I'll come back to that one.
There we are. The people who drafted this didn't do a very good job. Ignore these two
squares or rectangles. But this shows the per capita gross national product. And this is the
physical quality of life index, which is put on a scale of zero to a hundred. And these areas all
are developing areas of developing countries. North America, the USSR, and so forth all
have very high per capita gross national products and a high physical quality of life index.
These all should be over here; the drafters of these, I'm sorry, couldn't read I guess, heh.
This should be reversed. So forget about these, just forget about them entirely… but they're
all very high. But you'll notice how very low… you'll notice how these fall into cultural fields.
Where the black African countries are all very low in physical quality of life index, very low in
per capita GNP, but there's a range. You notice that for the most part, Asian countries have
low per capita income. But relatively high physical quality of life index. What that really
means is that they've learned how to take care of each other in some way. And indeed there
is one which falls way off scale up in here, which is Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has a physical quality
of life index which is extremely high. It's about 80. And indeed, their infant mortality rate is
lower than in Washington, DC. Their literacy rate is higher than in Washington DC, their life
expectancy at birth is higher than in Washington DC, and they accomplished this on a mean
per capita income of about a hundred and fifty dollars a year.
It's a fantastic achievement, a fantastic example of people taking care of themselves,
learning how to take care of themselves. The same situation is true in the state of Kerala, in
India. K-E-R-E-L-A. Or K-E-R-A-L-A, I can’t remember. It's rather an interesting part of India. It

doesn't differ from the rest of India in per capita income, but they too have a very high
physical quality of life index that is well over 70, 75. They somehow have learned how to
take care of each other and provide services that are necessary. I mention quickly that in the
case of Kerala, it's a matriarchy. I don't know if that has any significance or not, but it is a
matriarchy.
But what all of this demonstrates when you look at the fantastic per capita income, average
per capita income in Washington, DC, you suddenly realize that because of the large
underprivileged Black population in the city, that it has such a fantastically high illiteracy
rate, such a fantastically low life expectancy at birth, such a very high infant mortality rate,
where people are more malnourished than they are in parts of Asia. It makes one really
believe that we've got to come to grips with this whole problem of income distribution, with
this whole problem of how do we take care of the maximum number of people adequately?
Clearly, one can do it.
It's interesting to look at some of these other countries. The physical quality of life index of
the OPEC Arab countries is about the same as that of the other Arab countries, in spite of a
much higher income. One can say they just haven't had enough time yet. But it's about the
same. You will notice that up here in Africa, very high income, but still a low physical quality
of life index; and this is almost entirely due to the maldistribution of income, a few very
wealthy people. If you look at Latin America, their physical quality of life index goes up
higher. And that's mainly the southern countries of Argentina, Uruguay, and the like; Chile
with the mining. But their incomes are much higher than corresponding PQLIs in Asia; and of
course in Latin America, Latin America is notorious for maldistribution of income. You find
wealth there that pales the wealthiest people in the United States into insignificance. One
can seldom see the level of personal wealth that exists in Latin America even in a place like
the United States or Europe. And so maldistribution of income clearly plays a substantial
role.
And indeed, it's terribly interesting the influence that the physical quality of life index seems
to have upon birth rate. Somehow, for reasons not understood, as the physical quality of life
index increases, the birth rate decreases. When it gets up to be about 70, wham! it
decreases very very rapidly; and one would guess in part this is because of the fact that a
high physical quality of life index is associated with a workable infrastructure, an
educational system, and a communication system and the like. I don't mean to say that
there is a proven cause and effect relationship here. But the correlation is certainly a very
high one, and I suspect that on the basis of what we think we know about birth control
programs and the like, that the relationship is an important one.
Okay, could you turn that off now, please? So, the conclusion that we reached in the study
was that the world food situation indeed could be improved. But one had to work along

three major fronts. The first is that of the elimination of abject poverty. And I think that
this… really, this concept has had an effect, in that our own aid programs have done an
about-face. For years and years and years, developers that have… the planning people in
many developing countries such as India, for example, and the planning people in AID took
the view that you had to go the route of industrialization, have more and more
industrialization, use aid money, insofar as possible, for capital in major projects for
industrialization. Forget about the rural areas, because from the money, from the profits
that were made through industrialization, money would “trickle down.” It's called the
trickle-down theory. And that would lead eventually to agricultural production, increased
agricultural production, and the elimination of poverty. Well, this simply has not worked.
And I think this is one of the more important about-faces that has taken place since World
War II in major development policy considerations: that one has to concentrate on the areas
of poverty. One has to really look at who isn't getting the food and why aren't they getting
the food, and then come to grips with doing something about it. Getting them jobs; dealing
with with rural development on an elaborate scale; and then in the urban areas, of course,
you do have the problems of urban unemployment which are very severe, and there,
industrialization can help, but only if it's job-producing industrialization. An oil refinery
which is run by a computer and which requires two people watching a bunch of dials and
the only reason they need two is because one might drop dead—that doesn't really improve
the employment situation very much.
The second line of attack is the increase of food production itself, which is terribly
important. And there, the consensus is that—I think this is this is correct—that much more
food can be produced in the world today than is now being produced, and the places where
it can be produced most easily are the developing countries themselves. And the reason for
that is that their productivity now is still very low; that by applying scientific methods of
agriculture, that the necessary food can be grown. But as I will come to in a moment, at a
cost.
Now, what is the cost? The developing countries indeed can produce much more food. All
they have to do, if they grow wheat, is use these new varieties of wheat; tune them
genetically for the conditions in the particular locality, and these will give much greater
yields if you add enough water. If you add enough fertilizer. Where do they get the water?
Well, it rains, but you've got to ensure steady supply of water at the right time. This means
getting water out of a river, which means pumping it; or getting water out of a well, which
means pumping it. And how do you operate the pump? You use oil or electricity. Then you
add fertilizers, nitrogen fertilizers first. Where do you get the fixed nitrogen? Well, you
make it. What do you make it from? Natural gas or oil. Or you import it. And what does the
person who exports it make it from? Natural gas or oil. So in any event, you're importing
natural gas or oil.

And we saw how in the 70s, in the late 60s and early 70s, the green revolution started to
spread through India: a miracle. Varieties of wheat developed in Mexico in the Rockefeller
Foundation program were transferred to India, and the farmers in the Punjab got fantastic
yields. Very clever farmers; they knew how to add what they had at the right time and so
forth. But the Indians had to make fertilizers. They imported the oil from Saudi Arabia to
make the fertilizers. The price of fertilizers went up by a factor of 4. Or the price of oil went
up by a factor of four; the price of fertilizer went up by a factor of 4, and the consumption of
fertilizers by the farmers decreased by about a factor of 4. And the yields decreased by
about a factor of 4.
And not only were they not making the fertilizers, but buying them was difficult. Because
the major exporter of nitrogen fertilizers for Asia is Japan. Japan has a huge fertilizer
industry. The Japanese are pretty clever. They were limited on how much oil they had
available. They were hit at first by the embargo, but an indication of how politically effective
that embargo was is that the Japanese did a 180-degree change of foreign policy in about
five microseconds. So the embargo on Japan didn't last very long. She went from pro-Israel
to pro-Arab in [snaps fingers] like that. So the Japanese calculated they can make more
money by converting imported crude oil into automobiles than they could by converting
imported crude oil into fertilizer.
So they cut back on their fertilizer production, so then you couldn't buy it at any price if you
had the money. And they sent out high-level delegations in 1974, one to Peking and one to
New Delhi, announcing a 15% cut in fertilizer allocations. The problem of growing more food
is clearly a soluble one from a purely technological point of view, but you cannot divorce it
from the resource component, which means basically the amount of energy that you put
into the system. And if you don't have the energy to put into the system, then you're in real
trouble. And that's basically the problem in most developing countries today, simply
because there are so many of them are energy importers, and are destined to be for a long
time. India is one. Thailand is another; the Philippines another. For a while Indonesia was an
exporter, but is soon going to go over the hump. Malaysia is self-sufficient; the People's
Republic of China is self-sufficient, but Asia, for the most part, they are they are importers,
in spite of a certain amount of offshore oil and so forth.
This is basically one of the real problems that confronts us, or confronts them; but in
confronting them it confronts us. How can rural development take place and increased crop
yields be obtained without relying… without becoming hooked on imported petroleum? The
real question is, can these countries improve their agricultural production making use of
indigenous supplies, indigenous resources? Whether that power resource be a windmill, or
a water wheel, or whether it be an electrical generator using using methane from
agricultural waste, what have you. That is really one of the critical problems confronting us,

but the agricultural problem in these countries is not going to be solved in the absence of a
solution of the energy problem.
And in that way, these two problems are inextricably tied up together. There are many
subsidiary questions, of course, such as problems of rural electrification. Do they try to do it
on a massive centralized… using a massive centralized system, or a decentralized system, or
what? Now, of course, other resources are needed too, like phosphates. And indeed the
Chinese have started something brand new, in that they are now using phosphate deposits
on a village level that would not even be looked at twice by any self-respecting large-scale
chemical manufacturer, but which are adequate on a village level for fertilizing the fields
around that village. And a geologist in the institute which I had has uncovered the fact that
throughout much of the developing world, there are many such deposits that could be used.
They just haven't been looked at before adequately in this light.
Well, so much for the food problem as such. Let me come to one other complicating feature
which, again, involves food and it involves energy. And that is the whole problem of climate.
The climate in the world is always changing from natural causes; there has been a ceaseless
pulsation of mean temperature of the Earth from the beginning. Some of it on a time scale
of millions of years, some of it on a time scale of hundreds of thousands of years, and some
of it on a relatively short time scale. Let me… if you'll turn the light on again, please, I’ll go
back to some earlier slides.
This is a chart of the mean temperature of Iceland over the last millennium or thereabouts,
and you see that there have been significant ups and downs. And it's believed that this is
typical of the whole Northern Hemisphere. These temperatures are gleaned in ways that we
needn't go into here now, but they're probably pretty good. You notice we go through
periods of great warmth, and then through periods of relative coldness. This period in here
is known as the Little Ice Age, and indeed it was pretty cold. We can see this from historical
records, but then you will notice, wham—up we go. And this peak here is about 1940,
where it was warmer on the average than it has been in the last millennium.
And yet for some interesting reason, we call this temperature normal temperature. You will
notice we're going downhill and we're going downhill pretty rapidly, and I can show you that
in the next slide. Here, we give the same data, but going from 1870. And you see the Little
Ice Age here; and it's rather interesting to look at paintings that have been made of Swiss
glaciers and the like by tourists in the late part of this century, of the last century. Compared
with today, you know, they’ve just receded. Today you can't skate on the canals of
Amsterdam. People skated on the Thames River back in this period; it became, you know,
they called this normal. And so there has been a major change, a warming trend. And now
what is pretty clearly a cooling trend. Yeah?

[audience member asks a question in background]
BROWN: The situation is very complicated, but if you look at the natural causes for changes,
first on a long time scale, it’s changes in the Earth's orbit. Then on a shorter time scale,
apparently there are two major factors involved. One involves actual changes in the amount
of energy which the sun puts out, as evidenced by sunspots and the like. The second
involves particulate matter in the atmosphere, and this is intimately related to volcanic
explosions and the level of volcanic activity. At the time of Krakatoa, the winter after that,
they had the last major explosion early in the century. That was known as the year without a
summer. When you put particulate matter in the atmosphere, it reflects the sun's rays and
so things are cooler. Yeah?
[audience member continues]
At the moment, I don’t count them; I’m sorry, I don't. […] Well, no, your sunspot maximumminimum, that's an 11-year period. Yeah. […] But in any event, the combination of these
two, which act in opposite directions: particulate matter cools, and if you have an increase
of solar activity, then it can neutralize the particulate matter; if you have a decrease then
they can add up together.
Now, so much for natural causes, which are actually more complicated than what I've
indicated. Superimposed upon that, there are man-made complications. Now the manmade complications, we are beginning to believe, can be very serious. One man-made
complication is increasing particulate matter in the atmosphere as a result of overgrazing, as
a result of desertification. A second man-made complication is our outpouring of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere through the combustion of fossil fuels. A third, and related to
the latter, is in deforestation, which in effect decreases the rate at which excess carbon
dioxide can be assimilated into the biomass, and it's a complicated mess, that theoretically
has not really adequately been come to grips with, except—it so happens, and I'm very
proud of this fellow, because he was a postdoctoral fellow of mine. I got him interested in
carbon dioxide 25 years ago at Cal Tech, and got him measuring carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and he measured diurnal effects, and what it looks like in rainforests up in the
state of Washington, and what it looks like when you go up in a blimp, and so forth and so
on. Then he established a very important observatory on Mauna Loa in Hawaii, which has
given us now a record of the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere over ocean, the
ocean situation away from industry, for quite a few years now, and it's clearly going up.
Carbon dioxide is the only major atmospheric constituent the permeates the whole
atmosphere, which absorbs in the infrared. And in so doing, it has a marked effect upon the
radiation balance of the atmosphere, and has what we call a greenhouse effect in that it
traps infrared radiation. And as a result, the more carbon dioxide you have the greater you
will expect the mean temperature to be.

This might seem incongruous, then: we're getting cooling with increasing carbon dioxide.
But if you look in the southern hemisphere, there appears really to have been a heating, a
warming. And it is suspected that this cooling is in part the result ofnincreasing particulate
matter in the northern hemisphere as a result of industrial activity and the like, and the
particulate matter doesn't get across the equator, but the carbon dioxide does. The
particulate matter stays trapped north of the equator.
Well, I don't want to bore you with going into this in any more detail, except to point out
that here is the expected increase of carbon dioxide in the years ahead, which then can be
converted into increased mean temperature. And this is two-tenths of a degree centigrade,
four-tenths of a degree, six-tenths, eight-tenths, one degree by the year 2010. Now that
doesn't sound like much. But it is enough to produce major global changes. Now it might
sound comfortable, you know, we’re going to melt a lot of snow in the north, we’re not
going to have to pay so much to heat our houses. But associated with any temperature
change of that sort, there's bound to be a change in the circulation pattern of the
atmosphere. The atmosphere rotates around the Earth. And that means a change in the
pattern of distribution of rainfall. And that's really the critical thing. How is the pattern of
rainfall going to change as this whole process takes place?
Now, when you talk about a pattern of rainfall change, that implies it's going to rain where it
is not raining now… [laughing] and it's going to not rain where it is raining now, in many
places. Of critical importance to us is what's going to happen in the Midwest, in our
granaries. Of critical importance is what's going to happen to the monsoon belts. Will they
shift? Now, we saw a very interesting phenomenon in the last few years, when there was a
terrible drought in what is called the Sahel, which is the region of Africa south of the Sahara
Desert. They experienced a tremendous drought, and lots of people died; but one of the
most interesting phenomena was how the drought led to huge migrations of people. First,
tens of thousands of people jamming into the cities, hoping to find food and water there.
Others migrated across the Nigerian border with their cattle, hoping to find water for their
cattle. Suppose the monsoon belt in India… should the Indian subcontinent shift, if only by a
hundred miles or so. The fact is, people are living where they live now because that's where
it rains. That's where they have access to water. And if that moves a hundred miles away,
eventually, yes, a steady state sets in; but in the meantime, one has a dislocation which can
be devastating.
So it's going to be terribly important to examine these changes in the years ahead. They’ve
got to be monitored very very carefully, and the theoretical base for the meteorological
consequences of this are going to have to be explored in far greater depth than they have
thus far. Of course, one obvious implication is that we might have to ration the consumption
of fossil fuels in order to keep the rate of outpouring of carbon dioxide from getting too

high. But we can't cope with it. The thought of an international conference aimed at
rationing fossil fuels and coming to an agreement as to who gets to burn it and who doesn't
boggles the mind. And yet, I have friends who are not alarmists who are seriously discussing
this, as something that has to be examined very very carefully.
So, here we have the ultimate link-up between energy and food, and that the energy can
produce climatic changes which can dramatically affect the food supply. Again, I feel that
this is a problem that we can come to grips with. But like any problem, you’ve got to
understand the problem before you can solve it. And we are far from really understanding
this problem in all of its fantastic complexity. I think that's a good place to stop.
[applause]
[program ends]

